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Abstract
Within a general equilibrium framework a` la Long and Plosser (1983),
we investigate the dynamics emerging from the interactions of house-
holds and firms that are adaptive price setters and financially constrained.
Adaptive price-setting behavior induces micro founded out-of-equilibrium
dynamics along which agents become heterogeneous in terms of prices and
wealth. The stringency of the financial constraints determine the regime
into which the model settles: either an equilibrium one or a disequilibrium
one conductive to financial fragility and aggregate volatility. In this set-
ting, we investigate how the structure of the production network a↵ects
the emergence of aggregate volatility from micro-level price and finan-
cial shocks, hence providing a dynamical counterpart to recent results of
Acemoglu and al (2012).
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2012) investigate the influence of the topol-
ogy of production networks on the transmission of shocks and the build-up of
macroeconomic volatility. They show that in the presence of intersectoral input-
output linkages, microeconomic idiosyncratic shocks do not necessarily average
out but may lead to aggregate fluctuations. They also provide quantitative es-
timates which indicate that these fluctuations could be of the same order of
magnitude as those of US GDP.
These results potentially represent major advances in our understanding
of the origins of macro-economic fluctuations. Yet, the approach used by Ace-
moglu and co-authors is essentially static and asymptotic: “aggregate volatility”
is measured through a comparative static analysis of the level of GDP at equi-
librium when the number of sectors tends towards infinity. In this equilibrium
perspective, the actual mechanics of crisis and, more generally, the temporal
dimension are absent.
The aim of this paper is fill this gap by introducing a micro-founded dynamic
model in which the emergence and the propagation of shocks are endogenous,
the unfolding of crisis can actually be observed and where aggregate volatil-
ity materializes in a truly dynamic sense. This mainly implies shifting from a
framework where adjustment to equilibrium is assumed to take place instanta-
neously to a framework where convergence to or divergence from equilibrium is
determined endogenously. The e↵orts of general equilibrium theory in that di-
rection were based on centralized price adjustment processes and almost entirely
stopped by the impossibility results put forward in the Sonnenschein-Mantel-
Debreu theorem. We take here a di↵erent route and use agent-based modeling
to generate out-of-equilibrium dynamics via the simulation of the interactions
of boundedly rational and heterogeneous agents (see LeBaron and Tesfatsion,
2008, for an introduction to agent-based modeling).
More precisely, we place ourselves in the general equilibrium framework a` la
Long and Plosser (1983) considered by Acemoglu et al. (2012) and define out-of-
equilibrium dynamics through the interactions of agents that are adaptive price
setters and whose production is financially constrained. The assumption that
agents are adaptive price setters is based on recent work of ours in which we
show that evolutionary learning of heterogeneous price setting agents provides
a viable alternative to the Walrasian taˆtonnement (see Gintis, 2007; Gintis and
Mandel, 2012). The assumption that agents are financially constrained is based
on the work of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) emphasizing the real impacts of
asymmetric information on credit markets and is here taken as an endogenous
route to disequilibrium: financial constraints on production can impair the local
functioning of markets and hence generate endogenously micro-economic shocks
from which aggregate volatility can emerge. Moreover, as in previous work
on financial fragility by Delli Gatti, Gallegati and co-authors (most recently
Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Battiston et al., 2012a), the presence of credit networks
and the positive feedback between financial fragility and financial constraints
foster the propagation of financial shocks. As a whole, our model accounts
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both for processes of convergence towards equilibrium and for the endogenous
creation of shocks, disequilibrium and aggregate volatility. The model is stock-
flow consistent and dynamically complete.
The results we obtain in this setting confirm those of Acemoglu et al. (2012)
as far as the influence of the topology of the production network on aggregate
volatility is concerned. Yet, we also identify a strong connection between dise-
quilibrium and aggregate volatility, which is, by definition, absent in the equilib-
rium model of Acemoglu and co-authors. In our setting, it is out-of-equilibrium,
that is when prices move away from their general equilibrium values and markets
do not clear, that crisis and aggregate volatility materialize.
Disequilibrium itself is brought about by financial constraints which impair
the competitive functioning of markets and propagate shocks through credit
networks. Establishing this link between financial fragility and disequilibrium
is another contribution of the paper as it clarifies the relationships between
agent-based models and general equilibrium. Hence the paper contributes both
to the literature on the origins of aggregate fluctuations and to the theoretical
foundations of agent-based modeling.
There is a substantial literature on the origin of aggregate fluctuations that
investigate whether independent idiosyncratic shocks can generate aggregate
volatility. The pioneering contribution by Bak et al. (1993) looks at self-
organized criticality in production networks and show that independent shocks
fail to cancel in the aggregate if interactions are local and technologies non-
convex. Gabaix (2011) arrives at a similar conclusion in a model where the
distribution of firms’ size is fat-tailed. He moreover shows that the idiosyncratic
movements of the largest 100 firms in the United States appear to explain about
one-third of variations in output growth. Yet, the models by Bak and Gabaix
focus on the production sector and therefore lack macro-economic closure and
potential feedback mechanisms brought about e.g by variations in demand.
The “equilibrium” contributions by Acemoglu et al. (2012) and its precur-
sors such as (Horvath, 1998, 2000) and Dupor (1999) are more complete from
this perspective. Yet these authors consider aggregate volatility as an equilib-
rium response to exogenous productivity shocks in a static framework whereas
we emphasize the role of disequilibrium and the endogenous origin of shocks.
Hence, with respect to the equilibrium literature, our contribution is to ground
existing results on the non-diversification of shocks in a dynamical setting with
heterogenous interacting agents and to allow for the endogenous generation and
propagation of shocks via bankruptcies, defaults and network-based financial
accelerator mechanisms (see Delli Gatti et al., 2010) thanks to the introduction
of out-of-equilibrium dynamics and of an explicit financial structure. In partic-
ular, we address some of the research questions put forward in Acemoglu et al.
(2012): “another important area for future research is a systematic analysis of
the relationship between the structure of financial networks and the extent of
contagion and cascading failures.”
The relation between disequilibrium and aggregate fluctuations is on an-
other hand central to the agent-based literature (see among others Dosi et al.,
2010; Dawid et al., 2011; Mandel et al., 2010; Wolf et al., 2013). For exam-
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ple, in a series or recent contribution (see Napoletano et al., 2012; Dosi et al.,
2013), Dosi and co-authors emphasize how income inequality and/or the lack of
redistributive fiscal policies destabilize the economy, impair growth and employ-
ment, accentuate volatility. Our own contribution is more closely related to the
work of Delli Gatti, Gallegati and co-authors (see Delli Gatti et al., 2005, and
further references) emphasizing scaling laws and financial fragility as sources
of macroeconomic volatility. Yet, these agent-based models generally have one
or two aggregate sectors and can’t therefore investigate the influence of inter-
sectoral linkages that is central to Acemoglu et al. (2012) and to our analysis.
A notable exception is Battiston et al. (2007) who consider the spreading of
shocks in a hierarchical production structure where firms are linked both by
technological and trade-credit relationships.
Yet a main shortcoming of Battiston et al. (2007) and more generally of the
agent-based literature on financial fragility (Delli Gatti et al., 2005, and further
references) is that it abstracts away from the price formation process. Indeed, in
these models the dynamics of prices is determined by random process and lacks
behavioral foundations. More broadly, the link between this class of agent-based
models and the general equilibrium literature has, up to now, remained obscure.
Clarifying the issue a second contribution of this paper. By embedding a finan-
cial fragility model a` la Delli Gatti et al. in a general equilibrium framework,
we show that large exogenous shocks and violations of budgetary balance condi-
tions are not necessary to trigger a network-based financial accelerator. In our
model, losses and bankruptcies are brought about by disequilibrium rather than
by randomness. Hence our approach is, perhaps in a metaphorical sense, more
Schumpeterian: it is out-of-equilibrium that financial fragility and bankruptcy
materialize.
We use computational methods. We implement our model numerically and
analyze its properties via Monte-Carlo simulations. This is the standard ap-
proach in agent-based computational economics (see LeBaron and Tesfatsion,
2008). Yet, an important innovation of our model is its hybrid nature. Part
of the dynamics are defined by behavioral rules and local interactions as is
standard in the agent-based literature, part are defined in a more axiomatic
mode by assuming some form of e ciency, and then implemented as solutions
to linear programs. This allows to reduce the number of free parameters by
abstracting away from the details of processes whose time-scale or magnitude is
below these of concern in the model (this perspective on time-scales is akin to
the one leading to subscale parametrization in climate modeling (see Edwards,
2010)). However, this approach involves solving large and complex optimization
problems on networks. Therefore it raises, for the first time as far as we know,
the issue of computational capacity in the field of agent-based computational
economics. The simulations presented in this paper altogether required months
of computation time1 although none of them involve a large number of sectors
or of firms .
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes
1For a single-core machine.
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the model. In section three, we investigate the interplay between equilibrium,
financial fragility and disequilibrium. Section four analyzes the relationship
between the structure of the production network, convergence to equilibrium
and aggregate volatility. Section five concludes.
2 A multisectoral model
2.1 The general equilibrium framework
We investigate the dynamics of a multi-sectoral economy built up by a large
number of households, firms and banks, interconnected via input-output, com-
mercial credit, and financial credit networks.
We represent firms as financially constrained and boundedly rational agents,
which combine intermediary inputs and labor in view of production, and adap-
tively search for a profit-maximizing pricing policy. Households are inelastic la-
bor suppliers and can also act as entrepreneurs. Their wages and entrepreneurial
profits are the only source of final demand (i.e consumption). Banks are rule-
based suppliers of short-term credit.
Intermediary consumption is financed by commercial credits and hence de-
fines two networks linking firms: one of physical/commodity flows, one of finan-
cial obligations. Wages are anticipated so that leveraged firms possibly require
credit from the banks in order to finance production. These liabilities of firms
towards banks define a third, financial, network linking firms and banks.
Our representation of the firm is built upon two fundamental features: firms
are equity constrained (see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993) and adaptive price
setters (see Gintis, 2007). As demonstrated in the recent literature on financial
fragility (e.g Battiston et al., 2007; Delli Gatti et al., 2010), accounting for imper-
fect markets and financial constraints is key to understand the genesis of the fi-
nancial network and the spreading of shocks in the economy through bankruptcy
cascades and, more generally, financial accelerator mechanisms. Recognizing the
adaptive nature of decision making and the decentralized nature of prices allows
to develop micro-founded approaches of out-of-equilibrium dynamics (see Gin-
tis and Mandel, 2012). Combining both insights allows to situate the literature
on economic fragility vis-a`-vis the standard general equilibrium framework and
in particular to demonstrate that the propagation of shocks and volatility are
essentially out-of-equilibria phenomena.
In order to perform this comparison, we root our model in a standard Cobb-
Douglas technological infrastructure, identical to this in which Long and Plosser
(1983) develop their real business cycle model and Acemoglu et al. (2012) per-
form their equilibrium analysis of the decay of shocks in production networks.
Namely, firms are grouped in N distinct sectors producing homogeneous goods.
The production possibilities of firms in sector g are described by a production
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function Fg : RN+1+ ! R+, such that:
Fg(lg, xg) =  gl
↵g
g
NY
h=1
x
(1 ↵g)!g,h
g,h (1)
where the parameters  g > 0, ↵g 2]0, 1[ and !g,h   0 such that
PN
h=1 !g,h = 1
respectively represent productivity, the share of labor and the share of good h
in the total intermediate input use of firms in sector g, while the variables lg
and xg,h respectively correspond to the amount of labor hired and the amount
of commodity h used in the production process. The coe cient !g,h can be
related to the entry of an input-output table measuring the value of spending
on input h per dollar of production of good g.
Each household inelastically supplies a unit of labor. Whenever individ-
ual preferences have to be introduced, in order to ensure comparability with
the equilibrium literature, we shall assume that individual are characterized by
utility functions of the form
u(c1, · · · , cN ) =
NY
h=1
cvhh
where the variable ch stands for the consumption of good g and the parameter
vh   0 such that
PN
h=1 vh = 1 empirically corresponds to the share of expenses
devoted to good h.
We will consider there is the same finite numberM 2 N of households and of
firms in each sector2 and denote the economy by E(M,N,↵,  ,!, v), the set of
goods, by G = {1, · · · , N}, the set of firms by F = {(g, j) | g 2 G, j 2 {1, · · ·M}}
and the set of households by H = {1, · · · ,M}.
We can then define the equilibrium of the economy E(M,N,↵,  ,!, v) as
follows.
Definition 1 An equilibrium of the economy E(M,N,↵,  ,!, v) is any collec-
tion of prices p⇤ 2 RN+ , labor cost w⇤ 2 R+, consumption (x⇤i )i=1,··· ,M 2 RN⇥M+
and production plans (l⇤g,j , y⇤g,j)g=1,··· ,N,j=1,··· ,M 2 (R+ ⇥ RN+ )N⇥M+ such that:
1. For all i = 1 · · ·M, household i maximizes utility:
x⇤i := argmaxp⇤i ·xiw⇤u(xi)
2. For all g = 1 · · ·N, j = 1 · · ·M, firm (g, j) maximizes profit:
y⇤g,j := argmaxFg(lg,j ,yg,j, g)=yg,j,gp
⇤
g · yg,j,g   p⇤ g · yg,j, g   w⇤lg,j
.
2The number of firms per sector and of households is set identically to simplify the expo-
sition and the normalization of variables.
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3. Good markets clear:
MX
g=1
NX
j=1
y⇤g,j =
MX
i=1
x⇤i
4. Labor market clears:
MX
g=1
NX
j=1
l⇤g,j = M
Once labor is defined as the nume´raire and has its price fixed3 it is straight-
forward to show that the equilibrium of this economy is unique up to the allo-
cation of production among firms. In particular there is a unique equilibrium
price for goods, p⇤ 2 RN+ such that4:
log(p⇤) = (Id  !) 1
0@   log( 1)  ↵1 log(↵1) PNh=1 log(!1,h). . .
  log( 1)  ↵1 log(↵1) 
PN
h=1 log(!N,h)
1A (2)
2.2 The State Space
In order to extend the static results of Acemoglu et al. (2012) on the decay
of aggregate volatility and to clarify the relationships between the agent-based
financial fragility literature (see Battiston et al., 2007; Delli Gatti et al., 2010)
and general equilibrium, we undertake an exploration of out-of-equilibrium dy-
namics in the economy E(M,N,↵,  ,!, v).
In order to accurately account for financial interactions, we shall introduceM
financial agents or banks whose set is denoted by B. Bank k will be characterized
throughout by a level of net worth ak, corresponding to its financial capital .
Two key state variables will govern the behavior of firms and households: a
vector of private prices and a level of net worth. More precisely, we will denote
by pg,j 2 RN+ and ag,j 2 R+ (resp pi 2 RN+ and ai 2 R+) the vector of private
prices and the net worth of the jth firm5 in sector g (resp. of the ith household)
and let (p, a) 2 P ⇥A := (RN+ )(N+1)M ⇥ (R+)(N+2)M denote the complete state
of the system (it also includes the net worths of banks).
The private price for good h of firm (g, j) (resp. of the ith household),
pg,j,h (resp. pi,h), is a reserve price, the maximum price the firm (resp. the
household) is willing to pay for that good. The private price of firm (g, j) for
its own good, pg,j,g, is the price at which it is o↵ering its output for sale. On
top of being an accurate representation of the fact that firms actually are price
setters, private prices have good asymptotic properties in terms of convergence
3In the following, we set the labor cost in such a way that the mean price of commodities
equals one at equilibrium
4We denote by Id the identity matrix of size n. A detailed derivation is given in the
appendix of Acemoglu et al. (2012).
5Firm (g, j) hereafter.
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to general equilibrium when updated according to evolutionary dynamics, see
Gintis and Mandel (2012).
The net worths of households correspond to cash holdings to be spent on
consumption. The net worth of firm (g, j), ag,j , represents the amount of fi-
nancial capital it can autonomously employ in the production process. In line
with the idea of having credit-constrained firms a` la Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1993), we use financial capital as a measure of the firm’s financial robustness
and determine accordingly the extent of a firm’s access to credit and hence its
production capacity. Namely, we shall assume following previous work by Delli
Gatti et al., that the production capacity of firm (g, j) is given by the financially
constrained output function:
f(ag,j) =  a
 
g,j (3)
where ag,j 2 R+ is the net worth the firm holds,   > 0, and 0 <   < 1. The
parameters   and   condition the intensity at which capital is put in motion
in the economy. More precisely,   measures the extent to which there are
“decreasing returns” to financial robustness in terms of credit leverage, and
eventually production, it can yield. These parameters also implicitly define the
time-scale of the model through the production to capital ratio.
The initial stock of money in the model consists in the sum of the net worths
of banks, firms and households. Permanent addition to the stock of money can
occur at runtime in case a bank goes bankrupt (see below).
2.3 Initialization and transition
Initialization of the model consists in the choice of an initial value for the net
worth and private prices of each agent, i.e of an element (p0, a0) 2 P ⇥ A :=
(RN+ )(N+1)M ⇥ (R+)(N+2)M . Then, every period the following operations take
place sequentially:
• Real Step. The quantities of goods produced, exchanged and consumed
are determined as a function of net worths and private prices.
• Financial Step. The evolution of agents’ net worths are determined, on
the one hand by the outcome of the production and exchange processes
and on the other hand by the inflows and outflows of money between the
productive and the financial sector induced by the credit scheme according
to which production is financed. At this stage, firms and banks can go
bankrupt if their net worth becomes negative. New firms and banks are
then funded from existing capital in the financial sector.
• Price Step. The evolution of agents’ private prices is determined according
to stochastic evolutionary dynamics that use as measures of fitness the
profit of firms and the utility of households.
A time step of the model hence consists in the sequential application of the
real, financial and price steps. It returns updated values on one hand for the net
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worth and private prices of each agent and on the other hand for the economic
variables (production, consumption, profits,...) that have been correlatively
determined. Our actual assumptions about economic dynamics are embedded
within the description of each of these steps that is given below.
2.4 Real Dynamics
In order to capture the dynamic interactions between prices, quantities, and
credit conditions, we must first specify how a private price and net worth profile
(p, a) 2 P ⇥ A determines the level of production and its allocation in the
economy. In agent-based models, (e.g Dosi et al., 2010; Dawid et al., 2012;
Wolf et al., 2013; Mandel, 2012), this process is generally emerging from a
very detailed representation of the firms’ decisions and of their interactions
on the di↵erent markets. We consider that our analysis can abstract away
from part of these details as the time-scale at which they matter is below this
that is of concern when one focuses on aggregate volatility and convergence
to equilibrium. This perspective on time-scales is akin to the one leading to
subscale parametrization in climate modeling (see Edwards, 2010).
We shall also consider as a first approximation that production and allocation
of goods take place in a frictionless 6 way given the constraints implied by
the compatibility of private prices and the financial capacity. Finally, we shall
assume the agents are “computationally” rational in the sense that they are able
to perform cost minimization operations. These assumptions yield the following
representation of the production and allocation processes.
Firms determine a cost e cient input mix as follows. On the one hand, they
evaluate the costs of commodity inputs on the basis of their private prices. On
the other hand, they assign to the labor input, wages to be paid at the rate
w (which is fixed throughout the paper) as well as a mark-up   2 [0, 1] that
ought to generate a surplus for the owner/entrepreneur of the firm in case the
production is actually profitable (see subsection 2.5.3 below). Hence, firm (g, j)
chooses an input combination proportional to
(µg,j , ⌫g,j) := argminFg(lg,xg)=1 pg,jxg + (1 +  )wlg (4)
and therefore uses µg,j units of labor and a vector ⌫g,j of commodities per unit
of output produced.
Remark 1 Note that the mark-up rate   also determines the repartition of
the value-added that shall prevail at equilibrium: a share   :=
1
1 +  
should be
allocated to workers and a share 1     :=  
1 +  
to the owner/entrepreneur of
the firm.
6It would be straightforward to introduce frictions in the process, e.g by considering that
a certain share of production dissipates instead of being consumed. It seems reasonable to
focus first on the frictionless case and to delay generalization to further work.
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Households choose their preferred consumption mix given their private prices.
That is household i consumes proportionally to
 i := argmaxpi·xi1 ui(xi). (5)
In other words, household i will consume  i,h units of good h for every unit of
income spent.
Let us then denote by z(g,j),(g0,j0) the flow of good g from firm (g, j) to
firm (g0, j0), z(g,j),i the flow of good g from firm (g, j) to household i, zi,(g,j)
the flow of labor from household i to firm (g, j), lg,j the quantity of labor
employed by firm (g, j), xg,j,g0 the quantity of good g0 used as input by firm
(g, j), xi,g0 the quantity of good g0 consumed by household i, yg,j the quantity of
output produced by firm (g, j) and wi the income of household i. The production
and the allocation of goods are then determined as a solution of the following
maximization problem.
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
max ming2G
PM
i=1 xi,gPM
i=1  i,g
s.t
(i) 8(g, j), (g0, j0) 2 F , z(g,j),(g0,j0) > 0) pg,j,g  pg0,j0,g
(ii) 8(g, j),2 F , 8i 2 H z(g,j),i > 0) pg,j,g  pi,g
(iii) 8(g, j) 2 F , lg,j =
P
i2H zi,(g,j)
(iv) 8(g, j) 2 F , 8g0 2 G xg,j,g0 =
P
{j0|(g0,j0)2F} z(g0,j0),(g,j)
(v) 8(i) 2 H, 8g 2 G xi,g =
P
{j|(g,j)2F} z(g,j),i
(vi) 8(g, j) 2 F , P{(g0,j0)2F} z(g,j),(g0,j0) +P{i2H} z(g,j),i  yg,j
(vii) 8(g, j) 2 F , µg,j,yg,j  lg,j
(viii) 8(g, j) 2 F , 8g0 2 G, ⌫g,j,g0yg,j  xg,j,g0
(ix) 8(g, j) 2 F , yg,j  f(ag,j)
(x) 8i 2 H, wi = w
P
{(g,j)2F} zi,(g,j)
(xi) 8i 2 H, 8g 2 G, xi,g  (wi + ai) i,g
(6)
This amounts to assume that the production and allocation processes are ef-
ficient in the sense that as large a share of demand as possible is fulfilled.
More precisely, the minimal ratio of consumption to demand among goods
(ming2G
PM
i=1 xi,g/
PM
i=1  i,g) is maximized. Still, behavioral, technological and
institutional constraints apply.
Conditions (i) and (ii) state that agents only trade with peers using compat-
ible prices. Namely there can be a flow of good g between firm (g, j) and firm
(g0, j0) (resp. household i) only if the private price of firm (g0, j0) for good g (i.e
its reserve price) is lower than the private price of firm (g, j) for its own good
(i.e its selling price). Note that this is the least demanding assumption that
is consistent with the presence of private prices. In other words, it allows for
the largest number of trade opportunities to be seized. Yet the objective func-
tion, which is to maximize satisfaction of demand, will direct trade prioritarily
towards the agents with the lowest selling price.
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Conditions (iii) to (v) states that quantities are conserved during trades:
(iii) expresses the fact that the labor input of firm (g, j), lg,j , is equal to the
outflow of labor from its employees while (iv) states that its input in good g0,
xg,j,g0 , is equal to the outflow of good from its suppliers. Condition (v) is a
similar condition for the consumption inputs of household i.
Conditions (vi) to (ix) express the constraints on production. Namely, (vi)
states that the outflow of good from firm (g, j) must be less than its production
In other words, we assume that goods can’t be stored as inventories. Condition
(vii) and (viii) are technological constraints. They assert, in accordance with
equation (4), that firm (g, j) uses µg,j units of labor and a vector ⌫g,j of com-
modities per unit of output produced. Finally, condition (ix) is the financial
constraint on production given by equation (3).
Conditions (x) and (xi) are constraints on the household’s income and bud-
get. Condition (x) computes the household’s labor income under the assump-
tion that labor supply is uniformly paid at the unit wage w. Condition (xi)
states, first that the total budget to be spent on consumption is equal to this
period’s labor income plus wealth transferred from the preceding period (the
latter accounts mainly for dividends received last period, see subsection 2.5.3)
and second that, in accordance with equation (5), household i spends a share
 i,g of its budget on good g.
Hence production, income and consumption are completely determined by
the profile of private prices and net worth (p, a) 2 P ⇥ A. These being given,
the economy functions in an “e cient” way in the sense that as large a share as
possible of the final demand is fulfilled given the financial and price compatibil-
ity constraints. However, there are two potentially major sources of ine ciency
related respectively the distribution of financial capital and of prices. Concern-
ing financial capital, it might be misallocated, what leads to capacity shortage
and rationing in certain sectors and to capacity underutilization in others. Con-
cerning prices they might be dispersed, hence preventing trading, or they might
be away from their equilibrium values, what leads to rationing, misallocation
of goods, abnormal profits and losses and eventually bankruptcies. Note in
particular that unless agents all use the same equilibrium price, supply and
demand can’t balance exactly and hence constraints (vi) and (viii) can’t bind
simultaneously: there must be excess supply or ine cient use of inputs. Both
can trigger losses. Conversely, there might be abnormal profits in sectors with
excess demand.
Though it is standard in economic theory to focus on equilibrium situations
only, it is necessary here to introduce explicitly out-of-equilibrium trading as
we focus on the (possible) emergence of equilibrium (see Fisher, 1989). In this
context, to have firms act a price-makers is consistent with the fact that prices
are set in a decentralized manner in market economies and also consonant with
Walras’ (1874) original description of the workings of competition in decentral-
ized markets: out-of-equilibrium, price-setting firms strategically raise or lower
their prices in order to adapt to market conditions. Note however that firms are
e↵ectively price-makers only when markets are in disequilibrium. As we shall
see below, they can remain so if competition is indeed imperfect (e.g because
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of interferences with financial constraints). On the contrary, if competition is
strong enough, an equilibrium regime is established in which unilateral price de-
viation are unprofitable so that the law of one price and price-taking behavior
appear as emergent properties of the model (see below).
2.5 Financial Dynamics
2.5.1 Credits and Interests
The financial counterparts of the production and exchange processes are deter-
mined by the magnitude of these exchanges as well as by the scheme according
to which they are financed. We shall consider here a setting a` la Delli Gatti
et al. (2010), which account both for commercial credit between firms and fi-
nancial credit extended to firms by banks. Namely, we shall assume that sales
of productive inputs are financed by a commercial credit extended by the seller
to the buyer while wages are anticipated (i.e paid cash by the firms) and the
excess of the wage bill over the net worth of the firm is financed by a credit
extended by its bank to the firm (For each g 2 G, firm (g, j) is initially linked to
bank j ; the dynamics of the financial network are specified in subsection 2.6.1).
Following Delli Gatti et al. (2010), we consider the interest rates on both
commercial and financial credit are decreasing with the financial soundness (i.e
the net worth) of the lender and increasing with the leverage (i.e the ratio
between the level of debt and the net worth) of the borrower. More precisely
the interest rate charged by lender ` (be it a bank or a firm ) to borrower b is:
r`,b = ⇢a
 ⇢
` + ⇢
✓
db
ab
◆⇢
where ab (resp. al) refers to the net worth of the borrower (resp. of the lender)
at the beginning of the period, db 2 R+ is the total debt of the borrower before
interest (i.e the sum of the principals of the firm’s debts towards firms and
banks given below) and the parameter ⇢ 2 R+ controls the sensitivity of the
interest rate (see Delli Gatti et al., 2010, for details). Note that through the
dependence of the interest rate on the lender’s financial soundness, the credit
network plays a central role in the transmission and the amplification of financial
shocks. Indeed, as further described in section 3.3, the bankruptcy of a borrower
then a↵ects not only the lender’s balance sheet but also indirectly all the other
borrowers to which the lender is connected because of the resulting increase in
the interest rate charged by the lender.
2.5.2 Clearing
After production and allocation operations have taken place, the financial status
of a firm (g, j) is given by:
• Its net worth which consists on the one hand of the cash payments it
received from households during the period and on the other hand of
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the net worth it had at the beginning of the period net of the wage bill
(conversely, if the wage bill was greater than the available net worth, the
corresponding part of the net worth is zero and the di↵erence is part of the
firm’s debt). More precisely, the updated net worth of firm g, j is given
by7:
ag,j =
X
i2H
pg,j,gz(g,j),i +max(0, ag,j   wlg,j)
• Its liabilities towards other firms, which consist in the commercial credit
it has been granted plus interest payments. That is the debt of firm (g, j)
towards firm (g0, j0) is given by:
d(g,j),(g0,j0) := (1 + r(g0,j0),(g,j))d(g,j),(g0,j0)
where the principal of the debt is given by
d(g,j),(g0,j0) := pg0,j0,g0z(g0,j0),(g,j)
• Its liabilities towards its bank, which consist in the credit it has been
granted to finance its wage bill plus the interest payments. Namely, the
debt of firm (g, j) towards its bank k is given by:
d(g,j),k := (1 + rk,(g,j))d(g,j),k
where the principal of the debt is given by
d(g,j),k = min(0, wlg,j   ag,j)
Debts are then cleared by compensation. If complete clearing is impossible
because of default, that is if there are firms for which the value of liabilities
exceeds the one of assets (net worth plus debts from other firms), defaulting firms
are bankrupted/liquidated and their assets shared uniformly among creditors.
More precisely, the following clearing algorithm is implemented.
1. If for all (g, j) 2 F , one has:
ag,j +
X
{(g0,j0)2F}
d(g0,j0),(g,j)  
X
{(g0,j0)2F}
d(g,j),(g0,j0) +
X
{k2B}
d(g,j),k
then all the debts can be cleared by having each firm (g, j) adding to its
financial capital ag,j a net transfer ofX
{(g0,j0)2F}
d(g0,j0),(g,j)  
X
{(g0,j0)2F}
d(g,j),(g0,j0)  
X
{k2B}
d(g,j),k
and each bank k adding to its financial capital ak a net transfer ofX
{(g0,j0)2F}
d(g0,j0),k  
X
{(g0,j0)2F}
d(g0,j0),k.
7Recall that a refers to the net worth at the beginning of the period
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2. Otherwise, each firm (g0, j0) 2 F such that the condition 1. above does not
hold goes bankrupt. Its assets are allocated to its creditors proportionally
to the amount of outstanding debt. That is, the net worth and the claims
of each firm and bank are updated as follows (the symbol + = denotes an
incrementation, that is the variable on the left-hand side is updated by
adding the value of the expression on the right-hand side):
For all ` 2 F [ B/{(g0, j0)} :
8>>>><>>>>:
a` +=
d(g0,j0),`P
{(g0,j0)2F} d(g0,j0),(g0,j0) +
P
{k2B} d(g0,j0),k)
ag0,j0
8(g0, j0) 2 F ,
d(g0,j0),` +=
d(g0,j0),`P
{(g0,j0)2F} d(g0,j0),(g0,j0) +
P
{k2B} d(g0,j0),k)
d(g0,j0),(g0,j0)
For (g0, j0) : 8<: a(g0,j0) := 08(g0, j0) 2 F ,
d(g0,j0),(g0,j0) := 0
3. 1. and 2. are repeated until all firms are sound in the sense of 1.
It is relatively easy to check that this algorithm stops after a finite number of
iterations as there is at least one bankruptcy per (non-terminal) iteration and
at most N ⇥M firms can go bankrupt. Note also that each creditor is treated
in a purely symmetric manner but possibly for the order according to which
bankrupted firms are litigated, and this latter point does not a↵ect the outcome
of the algorithm (see Eisenberg and Noe, 2001).
A key implication of the presence of commercial credit in the model and
of the clearing mechanism is that the actual/financial profit of the firm does
not only depend on its commercial performance, which it can “control” through
its pricing policy, but also on the financial soundness of its partners, through
which it is in fact exposed to the whole credit network. Indeed the debt clearing
mechanism can propagate default far away from its source. The firm is hence
exposed to a systemic risk whose manifestations appear as random (at least
from the firm’s point of view). The only influence the firm has on this risk
is through the interest rate it charges. However, because of systemic e↵ects,
the idea of mitigating risk by a higher interest rate might be self-deceiving (see
Battiston et al., 2012a).
2.5.3 Accounting and financial flows
Actual/financial profits of firms are computed as the net increase in wealth
after the clearing of debts. Profits might di↵er from the value of sales minus
production costs because some of the firm’s creditors might have gone bankrupt
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and default on their commercial debt. Part of these profits are retained by
the firm in order to increase its financial capital, part are distributed to the
household sector. More precisely, for each g = 1 · · ·N and each j = 1 · · ·M,
firm (g, j) distributes to household j a dividend equal to the minimum between
its financial profit and the entrepreneurial share 1   in the value-added. More
precisely, if the financial profit is negative no dividend is distributed and if it is
positive, the dividend is set equal to:
min(ag,j   ag,j , (1   )(pg,jyg,j  
NX
h=1
MX
k=1
ph,kz(h,k),(g,j))).
The remaining share of the profit is retained in the firm’s capital. As far as the
banks are concerned they retain all their profits.
As far as losses are concerned, they are covered by the financial capital of
the agents (see clearing algorithm above) until the losses excess the financial
capital available, in which case the corresponding agent goes bankrupt. The
bankrupted firms are determined during the clearing algorithm. The amount
of their outstanding debts correspond to losses which are shared among their
creditors. The bankrupted banks are those whose financial capital becomes
negative after the clearing algorithm, that is banks k such that ak < 0. Note
that the outstanding deficit of a bankrupted bank does not have a counterpart in
the model. Indeed, this counterpart shall consist in debts to other banks which
credited their customers with (wage) payments made out of the money lent
by the bankrupted bank. However, as we do not represent interbank clearing,
these debts are not explicit and the loss can’t be assigned. As a consequence,
the stock of money increases of the corresponding amount8.
Each bankrupted firm and bank is then replaced by a new entrant that is
capitalized as follows.
• For each new firm, a bank is drawn at random to capitalize it. The new
capital of the firm is set equal to to the minimum between half the bank’s
capital and the mean wealth of firms in the economy. The correspond-
ing amount is subtracted from the capital of the bank that finances the
capitalization.
• For each new bank, another bank is drawn at random to capitalize it. The
outstanding deficit is foregone and the target new capital of the bank is
set equal to the mean capital of banks in the economy. However, as for
the firms, the actual capitalization can not exceed half the capital of the
bank financing the operation.
These assumptions correspond to an institutional setting in which firms are
managed by entrepreneurial households and funded by banks. The managers
8In fact, everything goes as if the functioning of the payment system was guaranteed by
the central bank through a commitment to compensate, via money creation, defaults in the
interbank clearing system.
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capture part of the profit (the part that is distributed), the other part consists
in retained earnings that increase the firm’s capital and therefore allows the
firm to expand. The assumption that each household manages the same num-
ber of firms (he receives compensation from all firms whose index is the same as
his, see above) is certainly over-simplistic but the distribution of wealth among
households has little impact on the dynamics of our model given that consump-
tion behavior is independent of the level of income (see subsection 2.4). The
assumption that firms are funded by banks rather than by households is con-
sistent with the fact that there are neither motives nor means for savings in
a setting where there is no capital accumulation and the only financial assets
are intra-period loans. As a matter of fact, in absence of capital accumula-
tion, aggregate budgetary balance implies that all income should be spent on
consumption.
The bankruptcy rules for firms are such that the stock of money is conserved
and hence the model is stock-flow consistent with the caveat that whenever a
bank goes bankrupt, the amount of its outstanding deficit yields a net mone-
tary creation of the same amount. The aggregate flows of capital between the
productive and the financial sectors are determined by the level of debt and
interests and by the financial fragility of the system. On the one hand, interests
payments induce a transfer of capital from the productive to the financial sector.
On the other hand, default and recapitalization of firms following bankruptcies
induce a transfer from the financial to the productive sector. Di↵erent feedback
mechanisms are also at play. A negative one following which a net transfer from
the productive to the financial sector increases the capital basis in the financial
sector and hence pushes downwards the interest rate. A positive one following
which a net transfer from the productive to the financial sector increases finan-
cial fragility in the productive sector and hence pushes upwards the interest
rate.
We investigate in details the outcome of these interconnected processes in
section 3. The key issue is the speed and the magnitude at which the financial
system can exchange capital with the productive sectors. It turns out that this
will be mainly determined by the total capital in the financial sector and the
distribution of wealth in the productive sector9.
2.6 Price Dynamics
Our representation of prices dynamics is in line with the core assumptions in
general equilibrium theory that firms are profit maximizers and households are
utility maximizers. Yet, we consider that this optimization is taking place adap-
tively through stochastic evolutionary process in which firms update their com-
9Yet it shall be emphasized that in many respects, our representation of the financial
system is over-simplistic. In particular, the capital of banks is here more of a bu↵er than a
truly operative variable. For example, leverage of banks is unbounded in our setting (banks’
capital only a↵ects the interest rate) and the only rationale for banks to invest in firms are
capital gains (they never receive dividends) although we lack the representation of the market
for firms’ stocks.
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petitiveness and their profitability through their private prices and households
update their consumption plan through a monetary evaluation again based on
their private prices. It turns out that this approach has much better dynamical
properties than the Walrasian taˆtonnement (see Gintis and Mandel, 2012).
Stochastic evolutionary processes are based on a measure of fitness that de-
termines which strategies are imitated and which disappear. In our case, the
fitness of an household is computed during consumption operations as the ra-
tio between utility and income. The fitness of a firm is the ratio of profit to
net worth at the beginning of the period (i.e return on equity). Agents are
then pooled according to their types: all households together and producers by
sectors. There are N + 1 such pools, each consisting of m = 1 · · ·M agents
characterized by a fitness fm and a private price pm. Prices are updated inde-
pendently for each pool of agents according to the following algorithm (from
Gintis, 2007).
1. Normalized fitness fm are computed according to fm =
fm   fmin
fmax   fmin .
2. Until a fraction ⌧copy of agents have been selected as imitators, an agent
is drawn at random and selected as an imitator with probability 1  fm.
Similarly, until a fraction ⌧copy of agents have been selected as models, an
agent is drawn at random and selected as a model with probability fm.
3. Each imitator is randomly paired with a model and copies its private price.
That is the imitator m, if paired with the model m0, sets the value of its
private price to pm0 .
Then prices mutate (see again Gintis, 2007), that is ⌧mutate agents are ran-
domly drawn and independently for each good divide or multiply (each with
probability one half) their price by a factor µ. That is if pk,g is the private
price of good g for agent k before mutation, the mutation turns it to µpk,g with
probability 1/2 and to pk,g/µ with probability 1/2. Eventually, each firm checks
the consistency of its prices by ensuring its selling price is at least equal to its
unit production cost.
Mutations might account for errors in the imitation process or random in-
novation. Their structural importance comes from the fact that they make the
evolutionary process ergodic.
2.6.1 Dynamics of the financial network
For each g 2 G, firm (g, j) is initially linked to bank j. The dynamics of the
financial network are identical to those in Delli Gatti et al. (2010). In every
period, after accounting takes place, each firm observes the interest rates o↵ered
by a randomly selected sample of 30% of the population of banks. If the interest
rate rold o↵ered by the current bank is less than the minimum interest rate
rnew o↵ered in the sample of banks observed, the firm sticks to its current
bank. Otherwise, with probability 1   e(rnew rold)/rnew the firm shifts to the
bank o↵ering the interest rate rnew. In other words, the lower the alternative
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interest rnew, the larger is the probability that the firm shifts to the competing
bank.
2.7 Simulation setting
We investigate the dynamics of the model via numerical simulations. A period
of the model corresponds to the sequential execution of the real, financial and
price steps and a simulation corresponds to the iteration of the model for a
finite number of periods. The model is implemented in Matlab10 and the linear
program in subsection (2.4) is solved using IBM ilog cplex optimization studio11.
The default parameters for simulations are reported in table 1. Some remarks
about the relation between simulation and the nature of the dynamics are also
in order at this stage.
• The real step is formally non-deterministic as it involves picking-up a
solution to the linear program in subsection (2.4) that can a priori admit
many such solutions. Yet, our implementation is deterministic as long as
the behavior of the optimization algorithms we use are. This shall be the
case12.
• The financial step is deterministic.
• The price step is stochastic but is implemented on the basis of a pseudo-
random number generator in order to ensure reproducibility of results.
3 General equilibrium and financial fragility.
The general equilibrium of the economy E(M,N,↵,  ,!, v) will play a central
role in our analysis as most of our results are stated vis-a`-vis this equilibrium:
convergence to equilibrium, mean residence time in or away of equilibrium,
e↵ects of the structure of the production network or of financial constraints
on equilibrium. It is therefore fundamental to characterize equilibrium in our
model: both analytically and as a reference point of the dynamics of simulations.
3.1 Financial viability and Equilibrium
In the economy E(M,N,↵,  ,!, v), the equilibrium consumption of each house-
hold and the equilibrium production aggregated at the sectoral level can be
inferred from the equilibrium price (see definition 1 and equation 2). However,
as there are constant returns to scale, profit maximization yields zero profits.
10MATLAB and Statistical Toolboxes Release 2013b, The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Mas-
sachusetts, United States.
11Made freely available for academic use by IBM. This IBM academic initiative is gratefully
acknowledged.
12According to the software provider: see CPLEX user’s manual on Advanced programming
techniques/Parallel optimizers/Determinism of results
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Symbol Interpretation Default value
N sectors 3
M agents per sector 50
  productivity parameter 2N
↵ share of labor in production 0.5
! input-output table 8g, g0 2 G,!g,g0 = 1
N
v expenditure shares 8g,2 G, vg, = 1
N
  share of labor in value-added 0.95
  magnitude of leverage 2
  returns to financial robustness 0.9
⇢ interest rate parameter 0.015
⌧copy price imitation rate 0.25
⌧mutate price mutation rate 0.05
µ mutation factor 0.1
Table 1: simulations’ default parameters
Hence the firm can only determine an optimal input mix, not an optimal pro-
duction level, on the basis of prices. In this sense, coordination through prices
is incomplete and the equilibrium is indeterminate.
In our setting, indeterminacy on the firm’s production level is reduced thanks
to the financially constrained output function, which provides a cap on the
production level of each firm. It is then a matter of basic accounting to realize
that general equilibrium and financial stability are intrinsically linked. Indeed,
unless there is a permanent inflow of money from the financial sector to the
productive ones, the total financial capital held by firms must remain constant
if production is to be sustained.
In a setting with constant returns, at a general equilibrium aggregate profits
shall be zero in each sector, so that the financial capital and the production
capacity remains constant. Hence, the equilibrium production and consumption
as well as the corresponding distribution of financial capital can be reproduced
period after period without additional inputs. Therefore, general equilibrium
is a viable state of our dynamical system that induces stability of both the
financial and the real spheres.
Away from equilibrium, a sector that makes positive profits sees its produc-
tion capacity growing. Now, in absence of financial inflows from the financial to
the production sphere, the profits of a sector are the losses of another. Hence
the counterpart of these out-of-equilibrium profits shall be out-of-equilibrium
losses in another sector whose production capacity must then shrink. Given the
sectoral interdependencies in the production structure, such a situation is not
viable as the shrinking of the unprofitable sector would eventually yield some
rationing of the profitable one and a general decrease of production. The only
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ways forward are technological innovation (which we do not consider here) or
inflow of additional financial capital, i.e the built-up of further leverage. In
other words, disequilibrium is for us a symptom of financial fragility.
We will further analyze these relationships between real and financial in-
stability below, but our initial inquiry is whether an economy can self-organize
into a viable equilibrium state. That is, do economic agents’ reaction to dis-
equilibrium such as price or capacity changes, form a strong enough feedback
mechanism to induce the convergence of the system towards equilibrium? A
positive answer to this question is implicitly assumed in most of the existing
economic theory. Previous simulation and analytical results of ours (see respec-
tively Gintis (2007) and Gintis and Mandel (2012)) suggest that in a setting
where competition is actually implemented through private updating of prices,
evolutionary dynamics do lead the system to equilibrium. Here, the issue is
revisited in a more realistic setting with intermediary production and financial
constraints. It turns out that financial constraints actually matter. More pre-
cisely the stability of equilibrium and the dynamical regime crucially depend on
the relative strength of resource and financial constraints. When the resource
(labor) constraints dominate, the economy e ciently plays its role of alloca-
tion of scarce resources and equilibrium prevails. When financial constraints
dominate, financial fragility is the key driver of the dynamics.
3.2 Convergence properties
Resources constraints in our economy are determined by the labor supply. In-
deed, in absence of technological innovation, labor supply defines an upper
bound on the aggregate production throughout time.
Conversely, given the leverage parameters   and  , the financial constraints
are defined by the initial wealth of firms and banks a0 2 A. These determine on
the one hand, the initial stock of money and the initial production capacity. On
the other hand, they will a↵ect the capital of firms and banks created at runtime.
Hence, they will determine the potential inflow of money in the production sector
during a period (see section 2.5.3).
When these financial constraints are weak, i.e when the stock and the poten-
tial inflow of capital in the economy is large with respect to the labor resources,
the model has very robust properties of convergence to equilibrium. To illus-
trate this point, we first consider a version of the model with three productive
sectors (N = 3), fifty agents per sector (M = 50), and the remaining parameters
set as in table 1 (in particular, the production network under consideration is
symmetric). In this setting, the equilibrium price is equal to 1 for every good
and the aggregate equilibrium production (resp. consumption) level is 100 (resp.
50). We initialize the model by drawing each price uniformly at random in [0, 2],
allocating an initial wealth of 1 to each firm and of 100 to each bank. Then,
resource constraints dominate as the equilibrium production level (100 units) is
much less than what firms can finance without recourse to credit (300 units).
Hence, as illustrated in the right panel of figure 1, total credit outstanding is
negligible meaning that wages are mainly financed by firms’ net worth. Con-
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straints on credit would anyhow be very weak: initial capital of banks is much
greater than the recurrent financing needs of the production sector.
In this economy, the dynamics of the model are very clearcut: in about
hundred periods, the mean private price of firms converges to its equilibrium
value and the standard deviation of the price among firms become negligible (see
figure 2) It is also the case that aggregate production and consumption reach
their equilibrium values and that demand and supply balance each other (see
left panel of figure 1). Hence the economy reaches equilibrium in approximately
hundred periods and rests there for the remaining of the simulation.
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Figure 2: Prices
To provide a quantitative assessment of the convergence properties of the
model, we perform 250 Monte-Carlo simulations where we let the number of
sectors vary from 2 to 6 and randomly draw 50 distinct production networks
(the other parameters being set as in table 1). To assess the results of these
simulations, we use a concept of approximate equilibrium:
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Definition 2 The model is in an ✏-equilibrium in period t if:
1. The euclidian distance between the mean selling price and the equilibrium
price is less than ✏;
2. The standard deviation of prices is less than ✏;
3. The excess demand (i.e total production minus total consumption minus
total intermediary consumption as determined in 2.4. ) is less than ✏ times
the total production.
We then measure for the 250 Monte-Carlo simulations the mean number of
periods in which the model is in an ✏-equilibrium (with ✏ = 0.1). The results are
reported in table 2. Though the convergence time increases with the number of
sectors, the model shows very robust properties of convergence to equilibrium.
In the last 100 periods of the simulation, the model spends in average 80% of
the time in equilibrium and for small number of sectors, the model is almost
always in equilibrium.
# of sectors 2 3 4 5 6 mean
mean # of ✏-equilibria in periods 1-500 431 324 267 265 184 294
mean # of ✏-equilibria in periods 100-500 384 314 261 262 184 281
mean # of ✏-equilibria in periods 400-500 97 82 67 79 62 78
Table 2: nb of periods in equilibrium
Hence, we do obtain converge to equilibrium when resource constraints dom-
inate. The small source of volatility introduced by the random mutations in
the price formation process do not get amplified into aggregate volatility nor
fragility. These good convergence properties are a first contribution of the
model: we extend to an economy with intermediary production, the results
of Gintis (2007) about the convergence to general equilibrium of private prices
under evolutionary dynamics. It is worth noting in this respect that the intro-
duction of e cient dynamics for the allocation of goods in 2.4 is perfectly in line
with the axiomatic characterization of exchange processes inducing evolutionary
stability of equilibrium obtained in Gintis and Mandel (2012).
3.3 Disequilibrium and financial fragility
The previous picture of economic equilibrium and financial stability seems at
odds with the results reported in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) where “prices are
important determinants of profits, which in turn a↵ect the accumulation of net
worth and financial fragility. The financial vulnerability of an agent therefore is
a↵ected by the dynamics of prices.”
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Yet, the economic environment considered in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) is
a particular case of ours with two sectors and intermediary consumption by
the second sector only, something that corresponds to ↵1 = 1,↵2 = 0.5 and
! =
✓
0 0
1 0
◆
. The dynamics we consider are also very similar to these of
Delli Gatti et al. (2010) but for the evolution of prices, which is purely random
and exogenous in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) while it is endogenous and directed by
evolutionary learning in our case. It is also the case that the sales of produced
quantities at a purely random price in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) induce net inflows
or outflows of money in the economy, whereas our model is stock-flow consistent
as final consumption is entirely financed by wages and dividends.
One could therefore claim that it is the lack of stock-flow consistency and
the exogenously imposed price volatility that induces financial fragility, network-
based financial accelerator mechanisms, bankruptcy avalanches and aggregate
volatility in Delli Gatti et al. (2010). We shall show this is not the case.
Indeed, even small shocks on the the price system induce variation in sales
and profits and eventually in firms’ net worth. As soon as the financial con-
straints are binding, downward variations in net worth lead to a decrease of pro-
ductive capacity. Decreased capacity in turn lowers the competitive pressure,
so that prices start leaving the equilibrium paths. Rationing and losses follow,
financial fragility increases and the way is paved for bankruptcy avalanches a` la
Delli Gatti et al. (2010).
To illustrate this process, we consider a three-sector version of the model with
parameters set as in Table 1 but where the initial net worth of firms is set equal
to 0.25 and the one of banks equal to 2 (recall that these values also condition
the capital of firms and banks created at runtime and hence the potential inflow
of capital into the system). This economy is financially constrained, on the one
hand because the aggregate production the firms can self-finance (75 units) is
less than the equilibrium production (100 units) and on the other hand because
the additional capital the banks can provide to the productive sector is also very
limited. Indeed, as underlined in section 2.5.3, the only source of increase of
the aggregate capital of the productive sector is the funding of new firms and
the write-o↵ of the claims on bankrupt firms, which are both financed by the
banks.
As illustrated in figures 3 and 4, the first hundred periods of the simulation
are rather similar to the ones leading to equilibrium in section 3.2. A slight
di↵erence being that in the very first periods, a series of bankruptcies induce
a massive transfer of capital from the financial to the productive sector (see
figure 5). It then seems that the productive sector reaches a level of capital
compatible with the equilibrium production level. Yet this high capitalization
is unsustainable as it is out of proportion with the financing flow that the
financial sector can maintain towards the productive sector (see the right panel
in figure 5). As a matter of fact, a shock to the price system around period 100
(see figure 4, most notably the right panel) triggers a temporary increase of the
mean and of the standard deviation of the price of good 1, which induces a drop
in demand (see figure 3) in sales, in profits and eventually in the net worth and
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Figure 5: Finance
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productive capacity of firms (see figure 6). Observing figure 5, one can remark
that this loss of financial capital in the production sector is not compensated by
a sizable inflow of capital from the financial to the production sector ; quite the
contrary, the total net worth of banks is increasing. This is due to the fact that,
as in Delli Gatti et al. (2010), the distribution of wealth among firms evolves
during the simulation (see the evolution of the coe cient of variation in figure
6) and becomes much more dispersed. Larger firms face losses without going
bankrupt and hence these losses are not passed to the financial sector (as it was
the case at the beginning of the simulation when the size distribution of firms
was uniform). Hence productive capacity does not recover, competition becomes
less stringent and prices exit the equilibrium paths (see figure 4 from period 100
and onwards). As underlined in section 3.1, out-of-equilibrium, financial losses
become structural. Consequently, the wealth of firm further decreases, interest
rates increase with the financial fragility of borrowers and a positive feedback
loop ensues which eventually leeds to a bankruptcy avalanche around period
170 (see figure 5).
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Figure 6: Firms’ wealth
The mechanisms at play are very similar to these described in Delli Gatti
et al. (2010) “The bankruptcy of a borrower creates a negative externality because
the bad debt recorded on the lender’s balance sheet yields an increase of the
interest rate charged to all the other borrowers. This is the starting point of
the financial accelerator. If the surviving borrowers experience an increase of
leverage due to the interest rate hike, the lender will react by raising the interest
rate even further. Financial fragility will spread to the neighborhood and may
spill over to the entire economy. An avalanche of bankruptcies may ensue.” Yet,
in our setting two other feedback mechanism are at play. First the decrease of
financial capital and production capacity reduces the strength of competition
and hence the stability of the price system. Second the sectoral interlinkages
propagate rationing shocks throughout the system. These rationing shocks play
the role of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks described in Acemoglu et al.
(2012) as the drivers of aggregate volatility.
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3.4 Financial constraints and phase transition
The simulations’ results reported above suggest that, depending on the strength
of the financial constraints, the model exhibits two very di↵erent regimes. One
is characterized by general equilibrium, low aggregate volatility and financial
stability. The other is characterized by market disequilibrium, financial fragility
and large aggregate volatility.
In order to test the assumption that financial constraints are the determi-
nants of these two regimes, we run a series of 750 Monte-Carlo simulations (MC)
where we let the default wealth of firms and banks vary (the other parameters
being fixed as in table 1). More precisely, the default wealth of firms, which we
denote by wf , takes the values (0.1250, 0.25, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 2), the
one of banks, which we denote by wb, takes the values (0.5, 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75,
2, 2.25, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 5, 10, 20, 50) and we run 5 MC over 500 periods for each
possible combination of the variables wf and wb. Figure 7 provides a graphical
illustration of the results by plotting, as a function of the default wealth of firms
and banks, the mean (over the five MC) number of periods for which the model
is in an ✏-equilibrium (with ✏ = 0, 1) and the mean volatility of GDP 13.
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Figure 7: Phase transition under financial constraints
The hypothesis that the financial constraints govern the regime of the model
is confirmed by the identification of a phase transition between the equilibrium
and the disequilibrium states of the model, which materializes as a critical line
in the (wf,wb) plane. For small values of the pair (wf,wb) the model almost
never is in equilibrium and exhibits high volatility, for large values of the pair
(wf,wb) the model settles in equilibrium and exhibits low volatility. When the
critical line is crossed, there is an abrupt transition between the two regimes.
This abrupt transition between the two regimes can be well-approximated by a
logistic function and suggests the existence of a phase-transition between equi-
librium and non-equilibrium regimes. In this respect, our results are very similar
13The values on the x and y axis of figure 7 are ordinal, i.e 1 (resp. 15) corresponds to the
smallest (reps. largest) value of wealth bank
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to those obtained in Gualdi et al. (2013): these authors show that phase tran-
sitions between equilibrium and disequilibrium can be driven by small shifts in
firms’ employment policy.
These results are robust with respect to change in the value of the other key
financial parameter that is the interest rate. Additional simulations ran with a
default interest rate varying between 0 and 6 percents yield a similar picture to
the one presented in this section.
Additionally, we test the robustness of the results to changes in the dividend
policy of the firm. The default financial policy of the firm is to distribute a
dividend as soon as it makes a profit in the period (see 2.5.3). This very myopic
behavior might be conductive to fragility as it prevents the firm from recon-
stituting a strong enough capital basis after it has been a↵ected by a negative
shock. In order to further investigate this point, we consider an alternative profit
distribution policy which consists in distributing profits only if the current capi-
tal of the firm is greater than a benchmark, which is set equal to the initial value
of the capital. The use of this alternative financial management rule does not
a↵ect the behavior of convergence to equilibrium reported in subsection 3.2 for
parameter values that do not induce financial constraints. However in a setting
with financial constraints, using the same parameter setting than in subsection
3.3, the results are qualitatively di↵erent (see figure 8). The model now exhibits
shifts between an equilibrium regime where prices stay around their equilibrium
value and aggregate volatility is very low, and a disequilibrium regime where
prices fluctuate away from their equilibrium value and aggregate volatility is
high.
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Figure 8: Markets
The main di↵erences with the processes that lead to collapse in section 3.3
is that the productive sector is now more resilient: bankruptcy crisis are less
acute and the economy eventually recovers. This is due to the fact that firms
now have time to recapitalize themselves after a shock.
Overall, one observes long-term fluctuations between an equilibrium regime
characterized by stability of price and production and a disequilibrium one char-
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acterized by price instability and financial fragility. This crisis regime is the
carrier of aggregate volatility in the model. In other words, local disequilib-
rium in a decentralized price system and networked financial fragility are the
micro-economic origins of aggregate volatility in our model. In the next section,
we investigate the influence of the structure of the production network on the
magnitude of these aggregate fluctuations.
4 Network structure and aggregate volatility
4.1 Network structure
The model introduced in the preceding sections allows to represent dynamic
fluctuations between equilibrium and disequilibrium. In this section, we use it to
analyze in a dynamical setting the relationships between network structure and
aggregate volatilty put forward by Fisher and Vega-Redondo (2006), Battiston
et al. (2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2012). In order to characterize network
structures, we will mainly use degree distributions. In our framework, the degree
of a sector g, defined as  g :=
PN
h=1 !h,g, corresponds to the share of sector g’s
output in the input supply of the entire economy. The production network can
be characterized among others in terms of:
• The mean of the degree sequence
  :=
1
N
NX
g=1
 g;
• The coe cient of variation of the degree sequence
⇠1 :=
qPN
g=1( g    )2p
N 
,
which is used as a first-order measure of the asymmetry of the network in
Acemoglu et al. (2012);
• The second order interconnectivity coe cient
⇠2 :=
NX
g=1
X
h 6=g
X
k 6=g,h
!h,g!k,g h k,
introduced by Acemoglu et al. (2012) to measure the extent to which sec-
tors with high degrees are interconnected to one another through common
suppliers.
We investigate the relationship between network structure, disequilibrium
and aggregate volatility for three types of networks: for the first type the de-
gree distribution is drawn uniformly, for the second it is drawn according to a
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lognormal distribution and for the third it is drawn according to a power law/
Pareto distribution. More precisely, the networks are constructed as follows.
We draw a degree sequence according to the prescribed distribution (relying
on Clauset et al. (2009) for power law distributions). The sequence is then
normalized (so as to ensure that the sum of input shares will sums to one in
every sector) and the network is constructed using a directed version of the
configuration model (see Newman et al., 2001).
For each type of networks, we run 125 Monte-Carlo simulations where we
let the parameters of the degree distributions vary so as to generate a sample
of networks with su ciently heterogeneous coe cients of variation and of inter-
connectivity (the number of sectors is fixed equal to 10, the number of agents
per sector equal to 25, initial wealth of firms to 0.5, initial wealth of banks to
20 and other parameters are set as in table 1).
We then analyze the results of these simulations along three dimensions: first
the relation between network structure, disequilibrium and aggregate volatility,
then the relation between aggregate volatility and (i) second order interconnec-
tivity and (ii) the presence of fat tails.
4.2 Equilibrium and volatility
Our results first of all confirm the relation between disequilibrium and aggregate
volatility established in the previous section. As illustrated in figure 9a and in
table 3 (first column), the time spent out of ✏-equilibrium14 is a very good
predictor of the volatility of GDP, independently of the network structure 15.
Our central concern then is the impact of the network’s structure on ag-
gregate volatility. In this respect, our results confirm the findings of Acemoglu
et al. (2012) about the positive impact of network’s asymmetry (measured by
the coe cient of variation of the degree sequence) on aggregate volatility. As
illustrated in figure 9b and table 3 (second column) independently of the type
of network considered (uniform, lognormal, power law), we find a very robust
statistical relation between the coe cient of variation of the production net-
work and GDP volatility: volatility increases exponentially with the coe cient
of variation.
A similarly monotone relationship exists between the coe cient of variation
and the time spent in equilibrium (see figure 10a). In line with the findings of
the preceding section, this suggests that the impact of the network’s structure
on aggregate volatility is mediated by disequilibrium. This hypothesis is further
backed by the fact that the impact of the coe cient of variation is much lower
when one controls for the number of periods spent in equilibrium (see third
column in table 3).
Overall, our results confirm those put forward in theorem 2 of Acemoglu
et al. (2012). We shall also argue that they have a stronger empirical content
14 ✏ is set equal to 0.1 throughout this section
15We restrict attention to simulation runs spending less than 80% of the time in equilibrium
to correct for the heteroscedasticity brought about by limited dependence: the volatility and
its variance decrease massively when the system spends the bulk of his time in equilibrium.
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as we measure the actual volatility of GDP in a dynamical setting rather than
its asymptotic properties in a static setting. Additionally, our results about the
number of equilibria show that the network structure has a significative impact
on the average residence time in equilibrium and hence somehow transcend those
of Acemoglu et al. (2012) as they show that the network structure matters even
before equilibrium is established, which is the starting point of Acemoglu et al.
(2012). Moreover, we do not need to resort to exogenous productivity shocks
to explain the origin of aggregate fluctuations. In our setting, the origin of
fluctuations can be traced to the microscopic shocks to the price system that
come along evolutionary dynamics and that bring about disequilibrium and
volatility when they are amplified by financial accelerator mechanisms.
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Figure 9: Determinants of GDP volatility
Log Vol. GDP Log Vol. GDP Log Vol.GDP
(Intercept) 3.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.52⇤⇤⇤ 3.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.03) (0.20)
coe↵. var 1.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.08)
% Time in equi.  2.4⇤⇤⇤  2.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.1) (0.15)
R2 0.85 0.84 0.88
Num. obs. 76.00 375.00 76.00
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 3: GDP Volatility and Equilibrium
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Figure 10: Impact of the coe cient of variation
4.3 Second order interconnectivity and aggregate volatil-
ity
We then focus on the impact of second order interconnectivity on volatility.
The coe cient of second order interconnectivity measures the extent to which
sectors with high degrees (those that are major suppliers to other sectors) are
interconnected to one another through common suppliers. Acemoglu and al
(2012) emphasize the fact that the second-order interconnectivity can have a
significant positive impact on volatility. We also find that the second order
interconnectivity has a statistically significant impact on volatility but surpris-
ingly, we find that the e↵ect is negative and hence opposite to the one identified
by Acemoglu and co-authors (see first column in table 4)
Presumably, this di↵erence is to a large extent explained by the fact that
Acemoglu and co-authors implicitly treat the coe cients of variation and of
interconnectivity as independent whereas, as illustrated in figure 10b, they are
in fact strongly (though not linearly) correlated. Yet, the negative impact of
the interconnectivity coe cient remains significant (though weaker) even when
the influence of the coe cient of variation is corrected for (see second column
in table 4).
A possible explanation is that, in our setting, the influence of interconnec-
tivity on the transmission of shocks between sectors emphasized by Acemoglu
and co-authors could be more than compensated by the fact that increased in-
terconnectivity implies larger markets for intermediary consumption and hence
further price-stabilizing competition. Indeed the latter e↵ect might increase the
stability of equilibrium and hence play an important role in our setting where
volatility is closely related to out-of-equilibrium dynamics. This e↵ect can’t be
accounted for in an equilibrium model where out-of-equilibrium dynamics are
not represented.
31
4.4 Heavy tails and aggregate volatility
There has been a lot of emphasis in the recent literature on the role of fat tails
in the propagation of shocks (see in particular Gabaix, 2011; Acemoglu et al.,
2012). In particular, in corollary 1 of Acemoglu et al. (2012) it is shown that
if the degree distribution of the production network follows a power law (and
hence is fat tailed), the coe cient of variation of the distribution is such that the
decay of aggregate volatility is slow. Hence fat tails are said to have a positive
impact on volatility. One could however argue that this impact of volatility is
due to the fact that the distribution has a large coe cient of variation (that
depends on the first and second moments of the distribution) rather than on the
presence of fat tails per se (that are usually associated with large third and/or
fourth moments). The e↵ects are hard to disentangle analytically but in our
setting where we consider both uniform networks and heavy-tail ones (lognormal
and power law), it su ces to test the impact of the type of network on aggregate
volatility while controlling for the impact of the coe cient of variation.
As illustrated in table 4 (see third and fourth columns) the presence of fat
tails (measured either via the skewness of the degree sequence or by a binary
variable equal to one if and only if the degree distribution is of a fat-tailed type)
has a statistically significant e↵ect on aggregate volatility even when controlling
for the impact of the coe cient of variation. However, this e↵ect is negative.
This strongly suggests that it is indeed because of their high variance rather
than because of their fat tail that fat-tailed degree distributions have a positive
impact on volatility. As for the negative impact of fat tails, for a given coe cient
Log Vol. GDP log Vol. GDP Log Vol.GDP Log Vol.GDP
(Intercept) 3.92⇤⇤⇤ 1.20⇤⇤⇤ 0.49⇤⇤⇤  0.56⇤⇤⇤
(0.11) (0.13) (0.03) (0.03)
coe↵. var 0.93⇤⇤⇤ 1.20 1.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
coe↵. connect  0.34⇤⇤⇤  0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
skewness  0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
fat-tail binary  0.11⇤ ⇤ ⇤
(0.04)
R2 0.59 0.85 0.85 0.84
Num. obs. 375.00 375.00 375.00 375.00
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 4: GDP Volatility and Network Structure
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of variation, a tentative explanation is that the presence of small sectors tends
to decrease the skewness and that small actors being more fragile, their presence
might also have a positive impact on aggregate volatility.
5 Conclusion
This paper confirms previous findings (see Gintis, 2007; Gintis and Mandel,
2012) that evolutionary dynamics applied to decentralized systems of private
prices have strong properties of convergence towards general equilibrium. We
have built on these properties to equip the standard real-business cycle model
a` la Long and Plosser (1983) with agent-based dynamics. In particular, we
have introduced financially constrained production and a primitive financial
architecture a` la Delli Gatti et al. (2010). We have revisited in this framework
the relationships between equilibrium, financial fragility and aggregate volatility.
Our first contribution is to show that the stability of equilibrium and the
dynamical regime of the economy crucially depend on the relative strength of
resource and financial constraints. When financial constraints are weak, the
economy behaves as an e cient mechanism for the allocation of scarce resources
thanks to the emergence of a general equilibrium. When financial constraints
bite, i.e outside a barter economy, there is a correspondence and a positive
feedback loop between disequilibrium and financial fragility: small price varia-
tions can trigger financial imbalances that get amplified by financial accelerator
mechanisms, these imbalances lead to reduced productive capacity and compet-
itive pressure, less competition favors out-of-equilibrium excursions of the price
system, what leads to additional financial imbalances. These findings allow to
explicit the link between the theory of financial fragility (see Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 1993; Delli Gatti et al., 2010, and earlier contributions) and general
equilibrium.
Our second contribution is to provide dynamic and endogenous foundations
to the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2012) on the network origins of aggregate
fluctuations. In our dynamical setting, we can measure aggregate volatility along
dimensions that are consistent with empirical observations, i.e through time
rather than as a static response to a distribution of shocks. We can also trace
the origin of aggregate fluctuations to the microscopic shocks to the price system
that come along evolutionary dynamics and that bring about disequilibrium and
volatility when they are amplified by financial accelerator mechanisms. More
generally, we show that volatility materializes mainly out-of-equilibrium and
that the network structure a↵ects aggregate volatility because it impacts the
speed of convergence to and the stability of equilibrium.
Though the financial constraints play a central role in our analysis, our
representation of the financial system is rather primitive. There are only short-
lived financial assets, no precautionary savings, no investment. There is no
interbank clearing mechanism, no bound on banks’ leverage, no monetary policy.
These gaps to be filled provide elements of a research program that could aim at
a better understanding of the transmission channel of monetary policy thanks
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to refined models of the financial system.
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